Le rôle des médias dans la crise brésilienne [1]

1Le 17 avril 2016, la Chambre des députés a voté l’autorisation de procédure de destitution de la présidente de la République. Dilma Rousseff a obtenu 146 votes. Il en fallait 172. C’était la première partie d’une fin divisée en trois étapes. Puis, Eduardo Cunha a été suspendu de ses fonctions comme député par la Cour suprême et Delcídio do Amaral a perdu son mandat de sénateur. Le 11 mai 2016, Dilma Rousseff a été écartée du pouvoir (55 votes à 22) par le Sénat. C’était sa deuxième mort politique. Les sénateurs ont maintenant 180 jours pour prendre une décision définitive. Dilma mourra-t-elle une troisième fois ? Pour que cela arrive, il faut 54 votes sur 81 sénateurs. Les dés semblent jetés.

2Les médias et l’opposition ont réussi un coup parfait : constitutionnel en apparence, sans recours sur le fond devant la cour constitutionnelle, montré en direct à la télévision, avec simulation des droits de défense, même si rien ne pouvait changer, et considéré comme une opération de sauvetage national contre la corruption de la gauche. Communiquer est bien plus qu’informer. Comprendre est plus que connaître. Une critique profonde demande la construction d’un contexte. Pour comprendre, connaître et critiquer le coup d’État brésilien de 2016, le coup plus que parfait, il faut le situer dans l’histoire politique républicaine du Brésil. Il fait partie d’une série où tout change pour revenir de la même façon. Pourquoi les médias ont-ils appuyé la destitution de Dilma Rousseff ? Comment ont-ils fait ? De quels médias s’agissait-il ?

3Comme dans d’autres moments de l’histoire du Brésil, par exemple en 1964, les médias se sont mis en marche d’abord par idéologie conservatrice : libéralisme économique réclamant moins d’État et plus de liberté pour les patrons, allègement des lois du travail, réforme de la sécurité sociale et prévalence des négociations entre patrons et travailleurs sur la rigidité des lois ; puis les médias croient avoir accompli leur devoir journalistique de dénonciation de la corruption du gouvernement ; enfin, il y a eu un fort sentiment médiatique contre le Parti des travailleurs, considéré comme porteur d’une idéologie marxiste ou étatiste dépassée. Les médias ont mené campagne contre le gouvernement soit en exagérant les méfaits de celui-ci avec des couvertures-fleuves, soit en minimisant les accusations portées contre l’opposition. Mais il y a eu aussi des éditoriaux demandant le départ de Dilma ou sa destitution.

4La compagne médiatique contre Dilma Rousseff et son gouvernement a été menée par les « suspects de toujours » : le puissant réseau Globo, les quotidiens Estado de S. Paulo et Folha de S. Paulo et les hebdomadaires Veja (avec un tirage à plus d’un million d’exemplaires), Época (appartenant à Globo) et IstoÉ. Le quotidien français Libération a bien compris la situation dans un texte publié le 17 avril 2016 : « Cette hostilité s’expliquerait par le fait que les groupes de presse sont aux mains d’une poignée de grandes familles soucieuses de défendre leurs intérêts économiques, soi-disant menacés par la gauche : les Marinho pour l’empire médiatique Globo, les Frias pour la Folha de São Paulo, premier quotidien national, les Civita pour l’hebdomadaire à fort tirage Veja. Ce brûlot de droite abonné aux unes sensationnalistes a fait de Lula l’homme à abattre. Son concurrent Istoé, pour sa part, se lâche contre Dilma Rousseff, accusée de passer ses nerfs sur le mobilier du palais présidentiel… »

5Les médias ont réduit Dilma Rousseff au statut de femme arrogante, décervelée, incompétente et à bout de nerfs. Lula a été transformé en homme assoiffé d’argent, ouvert à toutes les magouilles possibles, ivrogne et bavard. Le reste fait partie d’un scénario classique. Un fait en appelle un autre, les classes moyennes commencent à avoir peur, les réseaux sociaux servent de champ de bataille entre les défenseurs du gouvernement et les partisans de la destitution de la présidente. Ce n’était plus qu’une question de temps. Avec une demi-heure soutenue chaque soir au journal national (le 20 heures de Globo), un gouvernement de gauche ne pouvait pas tenir debout.

6Comme dans un classique des coups d’État, les médias ont tout fait, des reportages basés sur des sources anonymes et manquant de preuves aux éditoriaux assassins repris un peu partout dans le pays. L’alliance de Globo avec le Parquet et la police fédérale a permis des scoops à l’heure où il fallait un coup de pied dans la porte du gouvernement. Le pari est gagné. Les médias s’en réjouissent. Ce sont les médias étrangers qui petit à petit racontent la véritable histoire du coup d’État médiatique, constitutionnel et juridique donné au Brésil en avril et mai 2016. L’automne de la démocratie.

7Juremir Machado da Silva

8Université pontificale catholique, Porto Alegre

Access to information and the fight against corruption

9While issues of political communication are important in the impeachment process, it must be placed in the context of Dilma’s government’s national populist policies which the vast majority of economists blame for the unparalleled collapse and disorganization of the economy ; significantly she engaged in heavy unauthorized expenditure which lies at the very heart of the impeachment charges. Also Dilma, who had never held elected office and had been anointed by charismatic Lula to be his successor, did not display the leadership qualities necessary to correct her government’s largely self-inflicted woes, ones that a more experienced leader would have solved.

10Under PT-led governments, Brazil became a different country : slightly less unequal, more inclusive, more responsible. Inflation would remain under control, the country was surfing on the Chinese commodities boom and was gradually achieving greater economic and political status in the world. The interests of certain Brazilian entrepreneurs appeared to align with the government’s : huge contracts were offered associated with the football World Cup and the Olympics, Petrobras’ deep-sea oil discoveries provided potential investors the chance to build a national supply chain, select corporations received subsidies to become “national champions”. Investments and partnerships were proposed by government to both modernize and build airports, ports, railways, football stadiums, highways, etc. This new Brazil was projecting itself as providing vast opportunities and optimism grew. For a ufanist government communication apparatus, the support from overseas, and from popular and business elites, as well as the generally positive press coverage, were more than sufficient to offset the negative impacts policies were inflicting on the industrial economy in both domestic and export markets.

11However, the institutional sphere had also changed significantly. It had become easier to investigate and punish corruption. The combined impact of a generational transition and a range of changes – from the 1988 Constitution onwards – had led to the increasing autonomization, independence and investment in organs like the federal police, public prosecutors, audit offices and the judiciary. This first appeared in full view during the Mensalão, and today “Car Wash” is proving to be the most successful anti-corruption investigation in Brazil’s history because access to information and investigative techniques have improved greatly. For example, Switzerland was much loved by certain powerful Brazilians because of its banking secrets policy. By changing the policy and initiating cooperation with the Brazilian Public Prosecutor’s office, it became possible to “follow the money,” which became the principle investigation technique for obtaining objective evidence. Information from witnesses also became widely available as new laws that permitted plea-bargaining loosened all but the most powerful tongues. Much has come out in the press and the results have been devastating principally for the PT (but not for Dilma personally), increasingly interim president Temer’s party (PMDB) has been involved and three ministers were forced to resign during his administration’s first month. Many politicians live in fear of Car Wash and wish it would stop ; some hope Temer will do this – the autonomization of the operations suggests great difficulties in doing this. Temer has guaranteed he will not intervene.

12Some of the most important members of the Brazilian business elite now sleep in prison, either because they refuse to engage in plea-bargaining, or because they await their turn. Numerous retired or outof-office politicians and political nominees are serving jail sentences, others are under house arrest. On the day impeachment proceedings were opened in the house, 21 government-allied deputies were under investigation by “Car Wash”, and four (19 %) of these voted in favor of the now suspended president. As investigations spread to other areas, many more members of the political and employer elites are certain to have problems sleeping at night.

13Dilma Rousseff’s reelection campaign, beyond being paid for with legally declared contributions from large companies (who also contributed to opposition candidates), is alleged to have received illegal contributions especially from important public works contractors. The former president of Brazil’s largest multi-national company, Marcelo Odebrecht, has been in prison for a year. Recently he was sentenced to over 19 years of detention for corruption, money laundering and being a member of a criminal organization. Under plea-bargaining terms, he would typically be obliged to tell everything he knows about the illegal and legal payments he and his company authorized, his company would pay a huge fine and, in return, he would receive an attenuated jail sentence. The investigators have already accessed coded data from the company’s top secret “bribes department” and found a Caribbean bank owned by the group. While he has resisted plea-bargaining so far, the newspapers suggest he is getting ready to testify – this will be devastating.

14The costs of political campaigns in Brazil at both federal and state level, whether for the executive or the legislative, are extremely high. Political scientists have sought to understand the institutional bases of this cost structure, and to suggest changes : the size of electoral districts (today these are state-sized – this greatly increases the cost of campaigns for state and federal deputies when compared with smaller electoral districts as in France), the high number of parties guarantees representativity for many of the different groupings in society, but makes governability very difficult – leading to the use of spurious means to attract support which then feed into future election campaigns. Such questions are analyzed and intensively debated by Brazilian political scientists and politicians. There is general clarity that election campaign financing is destabilizing Brazilian democracy and also the nation’s economy. However, most observers see that reform is likely to be complex and tortuous.

15Dilma’s election campaigns officially paid US $ 12 million and US $ 23 million to João Santana for the elections of 2010 and 2014 respectively. A witness has indicated that Odebrecht paid more than US $ 16 million illegally to João Santana for both of Dilma’s campaigns and for that which led to Lula’s second mandate. Santana and his business partner/wife are being held in prison on the same charges as Odebrecht. While most Brazilians appear to strongly support “Car Wash”, and see it as contributing to making a better country, two questions are on peoples’ lips : where will this all stop and will Lula and Dilma follow in João Santana’s and Marcelo Odebrecht’s footsteps into jail ?

16Tom Dwyer

17Université de Campinas, Brésil